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Introduction
Beginning in 2007, the U.S. economy was hit with a series of damaging financial blows, the negative repercussions of which still affect Americans today.  In years prior thereto, various economic and political 
factors worked in unison to artificially inflate the selling price of residential 
homes within many U.S. markets.1  When the market could stand no more 
inflation, the metaphorical bubble burst, sending the banking, investment, 
and mortgage industries into a downward tailspin. 
Economists assert that the artificial inflation issue is an ongoing one whose damaging 
implications have not yet come to fruition in some areas.  This assertion is based on data 
showing that many homeowners that bought in the pre-2007 free-spirited loan market 
are still significantly underwater2 on their home mortgage loans.3  Due to a much higher 
likelihood of default, underwater loans are considered economically burdensome and 
unstable. 
Government entities and private analysts alike have proposed various solutions to 
reduce the current number of underwater mortgages, thus avoiding further instability via 
foreclosures.  One commentator advocates for a particularly unique approach.  Professor 
Robert Hockett of the Cornell University Law School prescribes the use of sovereign 
eminent domain authority to achieve the benefits that many perceive mass write-downs 
could afford.4  
In very general terms, Hockett’s plan (“the Plan”) suggests that local municipalities 
utilize their eminent domain power to “take” underwater mortgages from pooled units 
of securitized investor-trusts that would not otherwise be able to write-down such loans, 
and then restructure them in a way that reduces the risk of default, thus benefitting both 
national and local economies.5
This article will objectively address several major legal challenges such a program faces 
under Constitutional jurisprudence.  Section II below sets out a brief explanation of how the 
need for collective-action solutions such as the Plan arose, and then provides a summary 
of Hockett’s Plan.  Section III then analyzes the Plan under the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
current repertoire of Taking’s law, and explains why the Plan meets the Constitutional 
requirements thereof.  Sections IV and V highlight the legal hurdles the Plan faces under 
the U.S Constitution’s Contracts and Commerce Clauses, respectively.  Finally, Section 
V provides a conclusion and a summary of the impediments faced by Plan proponents 
moving forward, particularly the city of Richmond, California. 
* By Jacob R. Shelton, Candidate for Juris Doctor May 2015, Texas A & M University School of Law. 
1 See generally Christopher L. Peterson, Foreclosure, Subprime Mortgage Lending, and the Mortgage Electronic Registration System, 78 U. 
Cin. L. Rev. 1359 (2010); Benjamin S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of Fed. Res. Sys., Monetary Policy and the Housing Bubble, 
Address at the Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association (Jan. 3, 2010).
2 “Underwater” as used herein means that a homeowner owes more on their residential mortgage than what their house is actually worth on 
the market.  This premise is also known as “negative equity.”  
3 See Core Logic 2014 First Quarter Negative Equity Report, available at http://www.corelogic.com/research/negative-equity/corelogic-q1-
2014-equity-report.pdf (Illustrating that as of the first fiscal quarter of 2014, 12.7% of all U.S. mortgages were underwater) (last visited March 
21, 2015). 
4 Robert Hockett, It Takes A Village: Municipal Condemnation Proceedings and Public/private Partnerships for Mortgage Loan Modifica-
tion, Value Preservation, and Local Economic Recovery, 18 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 121 (2012) (hereinafter, “Hockett, It Takes a Village”). 
5 Id. 
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Collective-Action Problems and the Plan
Consider first what a mortgage is.  At its core, it is a financial instrument used to secure 
the repayment of a loan over a fixed term of years, generally in exchange for a lien on real 
property.6  Many lenders now specialize solely in this practice.  
In an effort to originate more loans (and thus make more money), lenders need to create 
cash flow. To do this, they sell all or a part of their interest in newly created mortgages into 
the secondary mortgage market.7  The secondary market in turn benefits from purchasing 
the loans through securitization.  
Securitization refers to the process of pooling contractual debt obligations (here 
mortgages), into securitized units with other mortgages of similar credit-worthiness.8 
Once created, these securitized units are referred to as collateralized mortgage obligations or 
mortgage-backed securities (“MBS”).9  These MBS are then put into trust accounts and sold to 
various groups of investors as part of their investment portfolios.  
The securitization process itself can occur in a variety of ways depending on the parties 
involved.  If the loan originator was a large commercial bank, for example, they may choose 
to handle the securitization/pooling process themselves, thereby saving some expense. 
Alternatively, the loan originator may engage in a complex series of legal conveyances 
through which it sells its loans to specialized loan servicers,10  who thereafter securitize and 
pool loans from various sources before selling an interest in them in the secondary market.11 
Due to the varied (and previously unregulated) nature of the securitization process, many 
ownership structures are possible.12  
The securitization process offers many economic benefits.  Because many specialized 
loan originators are so efficient at what they do, they prefer to focus entirely on creating 
profitable investments, rather than maintaining them.  By creating and selling mortgages 
at a discount into the investment market, lenders are able to generate more cash flow, thus 
facilitating the lending process by having more money to lend.13  
Relatedly, the process also benefits homebuyers.  Securitization (1), creates an attractive 
niche in the market for lenders to operate, so more financing options are available to 
borrowers, and (2), creates natural competition among lenders, incentivizing them to offer 
better rates to homebuyers.  Holistically then, the secondary mortgage market expands 
consumer access to credit.14  
MBS are however, not without drawbacks.  In the traditional mortgage lending model 
where the original lender retains title to a loan, the lender has the option of reducing the 
likelihood of borrower default by writing-down (or essentially off) a portion of the loan 
made, thus (arguably) incentivizing and increasing the likelihood of repayment.15   Modernly 
however, most underwater mortgages are held in the previously described private-label 
6 See generally 54A Am. Jur. 2d Mortgages § 1. 
7 This general concept, known as structured finance, encompasses “financial arrangements that serve to efficiently refinance and hedge … 
profitable economic activity beyond the scope of conventional forms of on-balance sheet securities (debt, bonds, equity) …” often at much 
lower transaction costs.  Andreas A. Jobst, Tranche Pricing in Subordinated Loan Securitization, 11-2 J. Structured Fin. 64 (Summer 2005).
8 Id.  
9 Id. 
10 The term “loan servicer” may refer to one of several players in the secondary mortgage market.  A true loan servicer simply contracts to 
handle the transaction between the originator, the securities broker, and the investor, acting in effect as a trustee; and then functions as an inter-
mediary by distributing funds to investors as homeowners make their payments.  In this instance, the loan servicer does not own any part of the 
securitized unit, but instead simply profits via a fee for handling the transaction.  Alternatively, some use the term “loan servicer” to refer to an 
entity that purchases, securitizes, and in the traditional sense “services” the pooled loans after selling a portion to end investors.  Because this 
latter type of servicer retains a portion of each MBS as its own investment, it is more appropriately referred to as an “aggregator.”  See Adam J. 
Levitin & Tara Twomey, Mortgage Servicing, 28 Yale J. on Reg. 1, 24 (2011) (Discussing the various types of “servicers.”).
11 See Kathryn E. Johnson, Carolyn E. Waldrep, The North Carolina Banking Institute Symposium on the Foreclosure Crisis: Overview, 14 
N.C. Banking Inst. 191, 193-94 (2010).
12 For purposes of this article, it is not necessary to delve too deeply into the various ways in which securitization can occur.  More important 
in this analysis is a basic understanding of the system’s structure, and the resulting limitations.
13 Jobst, supra note 7.
14 See Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, At the Economic Development Conference of the Greenlining Institute, San 
Francisco (Oct. 11, 1997) available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/1997/19971011.htm (Discussing the effects of the 
creation of securitized secondary mortgage market investments) (last visited March 23, 2015).  
15 Letivin & Twomey, supra note 10.
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securitized pooled units as MBS.  These securitized units are managed by loan servicers 
whose authority is governed by a pooling and servicing agreement (“PSA”).16  Nearly 
all PSAs restrict the loan servicer’s ability to modify the terms of the loan itself.17  This 
restriction is necessary to maintain the particular pass-through type of limited tax liability 
that makes mortgage-backed securities so attractive to investors, so there is no readily 
available work-around for this arrangement.18  
Add into the mix the cause of, and thus the need to restructure many of these securitized 
loans.  From the early 1990’s until 2006, U.S. residential home prices rose at unprecedented 
rates.  Causes of price inflation included: an increase in the home buying population,19 
conflicts of interest that promoted unscrupulous appraisals,20 government-sponsored 
mortgage deductions that made home ownership an attractive option for both investment, 
and residential purposes,21 and ease of consumer access to credit because of the secondary 
mortgage market, among others. 
The following chart illustrates the inflation bubble by showing both the historical trend 
of home price increases, and the artificially inflated rates that homes were selling at before 
the mortgage bubble burst. 22
From the 1990s through 2006, private label securitization through the secondary market 
was just one of several facilitators that allowed borrowers to take out loans on homes at 
artificially high prices.  Those price-inflated loans were then sold into securitized/pooled 
units as mortgage-backed securities.  Then the metaphorical inflation bubble burst, causing 
market home values to plummet.  Suddenly, borrower/homeowners find themselves 
upside down or “underwater” on their mortgages, owing investors much more than their 
homes are now worth in the market, and the PSAs that govern private-label loans do not 
allow them to be restructured.  As a result, many underwater loans are unmodifiable, and 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Commercial Real Estate Workouts § 1:5 (3d ed.). 
20 J. Kevin Murray, Issues in Appraisal Regulation: The Cracks in the Foundation of the Mortgage Lending Process, 43 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 
1301, 1312 (2010).
21 Robert Hardaway (FNaa1), The Great American Housing Bubble: Re-Examining Cause and Effect, 35 U. Dayton L. Rev. 33, 51 (2009). 
22 Information derived from the S&P/Case-Shiller national HPI, available at http://www.jparsons.net/housingbubble/ (last visited March 26, 
2015).
Information derived from the S&P/Case-Shiller national HPI, available at 
http://www.jparsons.n t/housingbubbl / (last visit d March 26, 2015). 
$0.00
$20,000.00
$40,000.00
$60,000.00
$80,000.00
$100,000.00
$120,000.00
$140,000.00
$160,000.00
$180,000.00
$200,000.00
$220,000.00
$240,000.00
1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006 2009
Na
tio
na
l A
ve
ra
ge
 H
om
e 
M
ar
ke
t V
al
ue
Year
Median Single Family Home Price
Historical Average Inflation Trend Actual Average Home Selling Price
Median Single Family Home Price
Figure 1
Cornell Real Estate REview
49
as such, bear a significantly higher likelihood of default. 
To remedy this economy-wide problem, Hockett’s Plan23 suggests a “collective-action” 
solution.24  He proposes that municipalities use their eminent domain authority to take 
the underwater mortgages themselves from their investor-owned securitized trusts (thus 
circumventing the restrictive PSAs), refinance them so that they more closely reflect the 
(current) actual value of the underlying home, and then sell them to new investors thereby 
decreasing the likelihood of default. 
Under the plan, local municipalities will begin by collaborating with privately owned 
enterprises to raise the large amounts of capital necessary to pay for the condemnations. 
Mortgage Resolution Partners, LLC (“MRP”) is one such privately owned venture capitalist 
firm seemingly created for the purpose.25  MRP initially raises the necessary funding by 
seeking out interested third-party investors interested in buying into trust accounts that 
will later be collateralized by re-securitized mortgages.26 MRP then fronts the raised capital 
to local municipalities to facilitate the Plan.27
Second, the local municipality and MRP will work together to establish a set of criteria 
to use when actually selecting which underwater loans they wish to take.28  At the outset, 
“it was MRP’s intent that municipalities purchase all underwater mortgages…[,]” but it 
was later conceded that municipalities should retain the flexibility to establish their own 
criteria for selecting the loans they wish to condemn.29  Also, initially MRP only intended 
to take performing loans, but preliminary loan selections in one area have included both 
performing and nonperforming loans.30
Third, after selecting which loans to take, the municipality will use its eminent domain 
power under the applicable state31 and U.S. Constitutions32 to effectively condemn the 
privately held securitized mortgages themselves, and pay the required “just compensation” 
to the investor/owners.33  
Finally, once it has purchased a mortgage through condemnation, the municipality will 
negotiate with the homeowner an entirely new mortgage loan based on the previously 
determined fair market value, at terms equal to those that the homeowner could currently 
obtain on the open market.34  The municipality will then convey the new mortgage to MRP 
for re-securitization, and placement as a mortgage-backed security into one of its various 
investor-financed trusts.35  MRP’s financial interest in facilitating this process is limited to a 
$4,500 transaction fee for each loan taken and processed through the Plan.36
23 As this has been an ongoing proposal over the last few years, several changes and revisions have been made to the structure and mechanics 
of the Plan. This summary attempts to integrate those updates as much as possible to provide the most accurate analysis of Hockett’s proposal. 
24 Hockett, It takes a Village, supra note 4. 
25 See http://mortgageresolutionpartners.com (last visited March 23, 2015). 
26 Id. 
27 Michael S. Moskowitz, Treading Water: Can Municipal Efforts to Condemn Underwater Mortgages Prevail? 41 Pepp. L. Rev. 633, 639 
(2013). 
28 Jacob J. Lantry, Municipal Lifeguards: The Constitutionality of Condemning and Refinancing Underwater Mortgages, 62 Drake L. Rev. 
243, 246 (2013). 
29 Id. Citing Interview with John Vlahoplus, Founder and Chief Strategy Officer, Mortgage Resolution Partners, in Des Moines, Iowa (Sept. 
28, 2012).  
30 Panel review with Robert Hockett, John Vlahoplus, et. Al., The Forum: Mortgage Relief or Bank Robbery? An Eminent Domain Show-
down, NYU School of Law (Feb. 10, 2014) available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0q-kAzZuLwU (last visited, Dec. 10, 2014).
31 See e.g. Cal. Const. art. I, § 19.
32 U.S. Const. amend. V. 
33 Hockett, It Takes a Village, supra note 4.
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Ben Hallman, San Bernardino Eminent Domain Proposal Arousing Concern from Mortgage Industry, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 16, 
2012), available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/16/sanbernardino-eminent-domain_n_1791773.html (last visited Dec. 10, 2014).
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Takings Law and the Plan 
An Overview of Takings Jurisprudence 
Claims of improper eminent domain use underlie almost all objections to the Plan. 
Commonly referred to as the “Takings Clause,” the last line of the Fifth Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution reads: “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation.”37  Scholars disagree about whether the Takings Clause is an express grant 
of eminent domain authority, or merely a limitation upon the implicit sovereign authority 
held as a matter of right.38  At any rate, such authority is accepted, so the Fifth Amendment 
does serve to limit sovereign eminent domain authority, irrespective of whether it does so 
inclusively or exclusively.
In its early applications, the Fifth Amendment (as part of the Bill of Rights) was only 
read to apply to the federal government,39 but has subsequently been incorporated through 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause40 so as to apply to state (and therefore 
local) governments as well.41  
When parsed, the Takings Clause requires analysis of several considerations, including: 
what kind of action amounts to a “taking,” what constitutes “public use,” and how “just 
compensation” should be calculated. 
Defining a Taking
Broadly stated, “[a] taking occurs when the government encroaches upon or occupies 
private land for its own proposed use.”42  In the simplest example, a taking occurs when 
a sovereign approaches a private landowner and demands the overturning of title to, or 
deprivative use of, all or a portion of the landowner’s property for some type of public 
use.43  
Initially, “takings” only occurred with respect to real property,44 but the doctrine has 
since been significantly relaxed in scope,45 thus conforming its application to the evolving 
definition of “property.”46  For example, instead of strictly using the term to define interests 
in real estate, “property” more appropriately describes a bundle of rights or interests, which 
can vary in form depending on the circumstances.47    
The modern definition of property now encompasses intangible assets as well, including 
37 U.S. Const. amend. V. 
38 See 26 Am. Jur. 2d Eminent Domain § 3 (“The power of eminent domain does not depend for its existence on a specific grant in the United 
States Constitution or statutes as it is inherent in sovereignty and exists in a sovereign state without any specific recognition.”).
39 See Barron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 250-51, (1833). 
40 U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1 (“No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ….”). 
41 Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 236 (1897). (“Due process of law, as applied to judicial proceedings instituted 
for the taking of private property for public use means. therefore, such process as recognizes the right of the owner to be compensated if his 
property be wrested from him and transferred to the public.”). 
42 10 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 231 (Originally published in 2006).
43 The classic example would involve a local government’s need to take privately owned land to construct a school, hospital, or roadway. 
44 See W. River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. 507, 516 (1848) (“The original idea of the eminent domain was the right of sovereignty, or residuum 
of power over the land which remained in the sovereign or lord paramount after the fee granted to the feudatory, and was therefore confined to 
the realty.”).
45 “In the progress of arts and commerce, when personal property became worthy of legal consideration, this power of sovereignty was 
extended over that, and even included debts.”  Id. 
46 For example, the state of California now broadly defines “property” as “real and personal property and any interest therein.” Cal. Civ. Proc. 
Code § 1235.170 (West).
47 “The term is generally used in this sense in the federal and state constitutional guarantees against deprivation of property without due 
process of law, and as so used, the word signifies the sum of all the rights and powers incident to ownership” 63C Am. Jur. 2d Property § 1 
(Referring to “property” as a “bundle of rights.”). 
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“contract rights,48 insurance policies,49 corporate equities,50 businesses as going concerns,51 
hunting rights,52 rights of way,53 and sports franchises,54 among others.”55
While many cases note the expansive definition of property for purposes of eminent 
domain, few courts have specifically dealt with the Taking Clause’s applicability to financial 
instruments, and almost none have explicitly applied it to mortgages.56  
Defining Public Use
Defining a “public use” is an oft-challenged aspect of takings jurisprudence.  In 
Berman v. Parker57 the Supreme Court began expanding the formerly strict public use 
requirement, thereby setting the stage for broadened future applications.  In response 
to large concentrations of substandard housing and “blighted” areas, in 1945 Congress 
enacted the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act (“the Red. Act”).58  Under the Red. 
Act, the District of Columbia would use its eminent domain authority to condemn large 
areas within a certain community, and then turn them over to a private developer for new 
construction.59  The principle opponent of the Red. Act owned a department store that came 
within the purview of the area to be condemned, but was not itself in a blighted condition.60 
Ultimately, the court rejected the argument that the public would not benefit from the taking 
of this particular owner's property due to (an isolated) lack of blight.61  
In effect, the Berman Court began to expand the taking clause’s “public use” requirement 
by giving near-absolute deference to legislative authority that dictates what a public use 
is, and in so doing, rejected a judicially scrutinous limitation on governmental eminent 
domain authority.62  
Relatedly, the Berman Court also rejected the opponent’s arguments that the taking could 
not constitute a legitimate public use because the Red. Act would result in another private 
owner ultimately having title to the condemned property.  In referencing its new deferential 
approach to legislative determinations of public use, the Court simply noted that “[t]he 
public end may be as well or better served through an agency of private enterprise than 
through a department of government—or so the Congress might conclude.”63  It is therefore 
reasoned that post facto private ownership does not automatically nullify the public use 
requirement. 
The Supreme Court’s next major opportunity to define the Taking Clause’s public 
48 See, e.g., U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 21-26 (1977).
49 See, e.g., Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 577-79 (1934). 
50 See, e.g., Offield v. N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R., 203 U.S. 372 (1906).
51 See, e.g., Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949).
52 See, e.g., Swan Lake Hunting Club v. United States, 381 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1967).
53 See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 223 U.S. 390, 404-07 (1912).
54 See, e.g., City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 646 P.2d 835 (Cal. 1982). 
55 Robert Hockett & John Vlahoplus, A Federalist Blessing in Disguise: From National Inaction to Local Action on Underwater Mortgages, 
7 Harvard Law & Policy Review 253, 270 (2013) (internal citations original). 
56 In Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 602 (1935), the Supreme Court mentioned in dicta  that “[i]f the public inter-
est requires, and permits, the taking of [the] property of individual mortgagees in order to relieve the necessities of individual mortgagors, resort 
must be had to proceedings by eminent domain ….”  While the Radford language is clear, two important considerations may curb its application 
to modern cases.  First, Radford was a bankruptcy case dealing with creditor rights, not intentional applications of eminent domain authority. 
Second, the Radford language was proffered over twenty years before the Supreme Court began to expand its definition of “public use” in 
1954 for eminent domain purposes (discussed infra).  Although subsequent state court decisions have applied eminent domain to mortgages, W. 
Fertilizer & Cordage Co. v. City of Alliance, 504 N.W.2d 808, 816 (Neb. 1993), the U.S. Supreme Court may yet impose additional limitations 
in light of these contextual considerations. 
57 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
58 Id. at 28.
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 34.
62 Id. at 32 (“Subject to specific constitutional limitations, when the legislature has spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms 
well-nigh conclusive.  In such cases, the legislature, not the judiciary, is the main guardian of the public needs to be served by social legislation, 
whether it be Congress [or a state legislature].”). 
63 Id. at 34.
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use vernacular came in Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff.64  In that case, the Court measured 
the constitutionality of Hawaii’s Land Reform Act of 1967 (“Land Act”).65  Hawaii’s state 
legislature created the Land Act in an effort to correct what it viewed as the residual market 
failures caused by past feudal land ownership structures on the Hawaiian islands.66  
The Land Act’s condemnation structure operates by allowing individual tenants67 
“living on single-family residential lots within developmental tracts at least five acres 
in size … to ask the Hawaii Housing Authority (“HHA”) to condemn the property on 
which they live.”68  When twenty-five eligible tenants within a given area make such a 
request, a hearing is held to determine whether they are allowed to move forward with 
condemnation.69  If so, the Land Act allows the HHA to condemn the property, thus taking 
it from the current owner and allowing the possessor/lessee of the property to take title and 
pay the required just compensation.
When considered in light of the Takings Clause, the Supreme Court unanimously 
found the Land Act constitutional.  In reaffirming its deferential approach founded under 
Berman, the Midkiff Court explained that the judiciary would not substitute its judgment 
for that of the legislature “as to what constitutes a public use.”70  In so doing however, the 
Court added much to the already expansive public use limitation by implying that the 
word “use” was too restrictive, and should instead be read to merely require that the taking 
justify a “public purpose.”71  
This interpretation again circumvents arguments that suggest an action cannot be a 
public use because the taken property returns to some other form of private ownership. 
This rationale allowed the Midkiff Court to dismiss arguments by the aggrieved condemnee-
landowners who objected based on the fact that the property ended up in the private hands 
of the lessee/possessors, and no other members of the public.   A public purpose was 
served because the taking alleviated the negative effects the land oligopoly had on “the 
normal functioning of the State’s residential land market [which had] forced thousands of 
individual homeowners to lease, rather than buy, the land underneath their homes.”72 
Finally, one of the Supreme Court’s most recent applications of the public use 
requirement is displayed in Kelo v. City of New London, Conn.73  In that case, the city of New 
London was experiencing economic downturn and flight due in large part to escalating local 
unemployment rates.74  Poor economic conditions caused state and local officials to target 
the area for “economic revitalization” programs.75  Enter Pfizer, a large pharmaceutical 
company in search of a home for its new 90-acre, $300 million dollar research facility.76 
The match would have seemed ideal to the city of New London.  The city was able to 
purchase most of the land needed, but had to use forced condemnation to acquire property 
held by a few holdout homeowners.77  The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the State Court’s 
determination that the New London revitalization project was within due bounds of the 
64 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
65 Haw.Rev.Stat., ch. 516. 
66 Midkiff, at 232 (“[A]fter extensive hearings, the Hawaii Legislature discovered that, while the State and Federal Governments owned 
almost 49% of the State’s land, another 47% was in the hands of only 72 private landowners. … The legislature concluded that concentrated 
land ownership was responsible for skewing the State’s residential fee simple market, inflating land prices, and injuring the public tranquility 
and welfare.”) (Internal citations omitted). 
67 The term “tenants” appropriately describes the disadvantaged residents the Land Act meant to help; these “tenants” owned the house in 
which they lived, but because of the feudal land ownership scheme (see note 66, supra), most were forced to lease or rent the real estate upon 
which their home had been built. 
68 Id. at 233. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 241. 
71 Id. (“[W]here the exercise of the eminent domain power is rationally related to a conceivable public purpose, the Court has never held a 
compensated taking to be proscribed by the Public Use Clause.”) (emphasis added). 
72 Id. at 242.
73 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 473. 
76 Id. 
77 Id at 475. 
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public use requirement.78
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Berman, Midkiff, and Kelo are instrumental under the 
public use requirement in at least two key respects: (1) the Supreme Court acknowledges its 
retreat from the formerly conservative definition of “public use,” by clearly affirming that 
the language now merely necessitates a “public purpose;”79 and (2) in determining what a 
public purpose is, the condemning authority is given much deference.80 
But even the Court’s seemingly unrestrained application of the new public purpose 
doctrine is still arguably limited by the repeated affirmation that a sovereign “would no 
doubt be forbidden from taking … land for the purpose of conferring a private benefit on a 
particular private party.”81  Though the limitation seems commanding, rare is the case in 
which the judiciary is willing to identify a purely private taking.  As long as some public 
purpose is articulable, much deference is given to the sovereign’s motives. 
Just Compensation
The final resistance from condemnees is usually based on challenges to the valuation 
of “just compensation.”82  Unlike the deference given when identifying a public purpose, 
the just compensation inquiry is contextually fact-based, and is left entirely to the judicial 
process.83  
By way of interpretation, the phrase “just compensation” is a mandatory remedy that 
equates to the fair market value of taken property,84 at the time of the taking.85  Based on 
this standard, the property owner must be paid what a willing buyer would pay a willing 
seller at the time the taking occurs.86  Further, it is the condemnee’s loss, and not the takers 
gain that is the proper valuation of the taken property.87  Deviation from this measure is 
appropriate only when market value is too difficult to determine, or its measure would 
work as an injustice on the owner, or the public.88 
Takings Law as Applied to the Plan
The most forward and prominent objections to the Plan are based on assertions of 
improper eminent domain use.89  But as explained above, expansive applications of sovereign 
condemnation authority are alive and widely recognized by the legal community, and 
are applicable to intangible property such as mortgages.  Primarily then, these objections 
come not from legal experts, but from (a) economic and political theorists fundamentally 
opposed to redistributive social policies, and (b) parties heavily involved in secondary 
market finance who would actually be affected by the Plan.  When viewed in this light, 
most of these objections are properly addressed through the holistic policies behind the 
Plan itself, but have no place in a pure legal authority analysis.
78 Id. at 489-90.
79 Id. at 479. “[T]his ‘Court long ago rejected any literal requirement that condemned property be put into use for the general public.’”  Id. 
“[W]hen this Court began applying the Fifth Amendment to the States at the close of the 19th century, it embraced the broader and more natural 
interpretation of public use as “public purpose.”  Id. at 480.
80 Id. at 483-84.
81 Id. (emphasis added); See also Midkiff, 467 U.S., at 245 (“A purely private taking could not withstand the scrutiny of the public use require-
ment; it would serve no legitimate purpose of government and would thus be void[.]”).
82 U.S. Const. amend. V.
83 Monongahela Nav. Co. v. U.S., 148 U.S. at 327 (“The legislature may determine what private property is needed for public purposes; that 
is a question of a political and legislative character. But when the taking has been ordered, then the question of compensation is judicial.”). 
84 Marisa Fegan, Just Compensation Standards and Eminent Domain Injustices: An Underexamined Connection and Opportunity for Reform, 
6 Conn. Pub. Int. L.J. 269, 272 (2007)  (“Thirty years [after Monongahela], in Olson v. United States, the Supreme Court articulated the ‘equiva-
lency’ discussed in Monongahela as fair market value.”).
85 United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 29 (1984); Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934).
86 Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 9 (1984). 
87 United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946).
88 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. at 25. 
89 See Lawrence Kudlow, The Kudlow Repot: Interview with Robert Hockett (Aug. 8, 2013) available at http://video.cnbc.com/
gallery/?video=3000189052 (last visited Dec. 10, 2014). 
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Because the Plan itself affirmatively advocates for the use of eminent domain, a taking 
is definitively occurring.90  This leaves only three issues for consideration: (1) whether a 
sufficient pubic use is effectuated, (2) whether a purely private taking would occur, and (3) 
how to properly valuate just compensation. 
Public Use
As the Supreme Court has consistently reaffirmed since its Berman decision, legislatures 
are given almost complete deference when defining public use.91  Moreover, public use does 
not necessarily even mean “use” in the literal sense, but instead merely requires a proffered 
public purpose.  Two of the most commonly relied on purposes are those discussed in 
connection with Berman, and Kelo: reversing and/or preventing blight, and economic 
development. 
The Plan likely meets both purposes.  Reversing and preventing blight is largely 
beneficial for the local public, while economic development serves both local and national 
economies.  As Professor Hockett himself explains, “each municipality will preserve 
neighborhood integrity, property values, and the revenue base from which it funds services. 
[The Plan] keeps residents in their own homes—still owning and paying on them rather 
than falling into default and foreclosure ….”92
To meet the public use requirement, it is not even necessary that the Plan’s stated goals 
be met if the exercising authority could have rationally believed that they would be at the 
outset.93 The Plan therefore meets the low burden, merely by virtue of its asserted purpose. 
Purely Private Taking
Though the judiciary consistently affirms that takings of a purely private nature 
would be an unconstitutional exercise of eminent domain authority, a case with facts as 
individualist-based as those in Midkiff suggest that a purely private taking would rarely, if 
ever be identified.  In that case, even giving fee simple title of each lot to a single person was 
not a purely private taking because the scheme therein was utilized by more than just one 
person, and necessarily provided communal economic benefits.  When viewed this way, 
the Court implies that a purely private taking could only occur when the deferential public 
use requirement is not itself satisfied.94
Because by their very terms MBS require multiple interest owners in a given asset, it is 
rarely, if ever possible to assert that the taken mortgages are conveyed to a single private 
owner if they are thereafter securitized according to secondary market norms as the Plan 
asserts they will be.  This distributive ownership structure is far less offensive to the purely 
private taking analysis as applied to the facts of Midkiff, where fee simple title ended up in 
the hands of individual private owners. 
Moreover, where the economic benefits in cases like Berman, Midkiff, and Kelo were 
largely isolated to a given geographic area, Hockett’s Plan touts both local and nationwide 
economic relief through reduced foreclosures.  In sum, though it may seem like a purely 
private taking to a layperson, legal precedent dictates otherwise.
90 See generally Hockett, It Takes a Village, supra note 4, at 151.
91 In this context, the local municipality is the equivalent of a “legislature” because they have the ability to invoke condemnation authority. 
92 Id. at 156-57. 
93 Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 671–672 (1981) (“Of course, this Act, like any other, may 
not be successful in achieving its intended goals. But ‘whether in fact the provision will accomplish its objectives is not the question: the 
[constitutional requirement] is satisfied if ... [the state] Legislature rationally could have believed that the [Act] would promote its objective.”). 
94 Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 245 (“A purely private taking could not withstand the scrutiny of the public use requirement; it would serve no legiti-
mate purpose of government and would thus be void.”).
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Just Compensation
Most problematic for the Plan is the valuation of just compensation. To be viable, 
Hockett’s Plan requires the taking authority to purchase the loans for something much less 
than 100% of the actual market value of the underlying home (likely around 80%).  This way, 
after factoring in transaction costs and MRP’s fees, when the new mortgage arrangement 
is worked out between MRP, the local condemning authority, and the homeowner, the new 
mortgage loan amount will be closer to 100-110% of the home’s actual market value; which 
is still substantially less than the underwater mortgage was when taken (the underwater 
loan could have been as high as 300% of the home’s value).95  
Consider a hypothetical96 based on a single home: 
• Home X has a current market value of $200,000;
• Due to a variety of factors, the mortgage on home X is currently underwater,
with its mortgagor owing a total of $300,000.  This can also be stated as saying
the investors who own the mortgage have a $300,000 expectation interest based
on the face value of the loan;
• For Hockett’s Plan to work, MRP would need to be able to initially take the loan
from the investors for approximately $160,000;
• When re-mortgaged and re-securitized, the new loan on the home X will have a
face value of approximately $200-210,000.
Examples like this one illustrate the concerns of many critics.  Facially, it seems 
improbable that the Plan can both pay a constitutionally fair amount of just compensation, 
and create the growth and stability that it posits.  Assuming (as discussed supra) that this 
is an appropriate exercise of eminent domain authority, can MRP and the local condemning 
authority show that the $300,000 face-valued mortgage is actually only worth $160,000 in 
its current state?  
Speaking in practical terms, a mortgagee will always have the right to foreclose upon 
default and receive the value of the collateral.  In our hypothetical, this would yield the 
securitized investors $200,000., less the costs of foreclosure.97  
Because just compensation is based on the value of an asset when taken (as opposed to 
its potential future value), the relevant question is “whether the loans’ expected value can 
be raised sufficiently to offset the write-downs and associated transaction costs.”98  Hockett 
himself proposes two avenues to calculate the appropriate amount of compensation.99 
Avenue A equates mortgage-backed securities with market-traded bonds, and suggests 
that since bonds are traded at a discount from their face value, mortgage-backed securities 
should be as well.100 In some cases, “[w]here mortgage-backed securities associated with 
a particular loan pool or analogous pools trade at a discount,”101 the fair market valuation 
method would be the same as it is for real property.  One would need to look to similarly 
situated securities to see what they are trading at when the taking occurs.102 But it is unlikely 
95 See Panel Review with Hockett & Vlahoplus, supra note 30. 
96 Hypothetical and criticisms are derived from Matt Levine, Mortgage Investors Don’t Want Richmond to Take Away Their Mortgages (Aug. 
8, 2013) available at http://dealbreaker.com/2013/08/mortgage-investors-dont-want-richmond-to-take-away-their-mortgages/ (last visited Dec. 
11, 2014). 
97 This is somewhat of a crude example; when a foreclosure on a MBS loan occurs, the distribution of funds is far more complicated, and 
would need to take into account the variously owned interests in the loan, and the contracted management fees of the loan servicer. 
98 Robert Hockett, Paying Paul and Robbing No One: An Eminent Domain Solution for Underwater Mortgage Debt, 19 Current Issues in 
Econ. & Fin., no. 5, 2013, at 1 (Hereinafter “Hockett, Paying Paul”).
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 It is worth noting that because the trading prices for securities can fluctuate greatly from one day to the next (unlike real estate), there 
exists the potential for valuation manipulation (aka foul play) depending on when the taking occurs.  
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that this method could prove consistently effective because the loans at issue will vary 
drastically in their terms, unlike market-traded bonds. 
Alternatively, when the data necessary for avenue A is unavailable, avenue B suggests 
a work-back method.103  Though not specifically formulated, it purports to rely on annual 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac publications containing anticipated default rates for PLS 
underwater mortgages, costs of foreclosure and associated recovery rates, and other 
“discount rates.”104 
Of his two valuation methods, Hockett’s first approach would forgo the result-oriented 
valuation analysis inherent in the above hypothetical and simply look to see what similarly 
situated mortgage-backed securities are trading at, and letting the numbers naturally 
fall where they do.  Such an approach makes one wonder if mortgage-backed securities 
investors make cost-benefit decisions based on likelihood of borrower default and resulting 
remedies when they select investments, or if they simply look to see which type of loans 
are performing and which are not.  The fluidity of the securities market suggests the latter. 
Hockett’s second model takes into consideration a variety of externalities such as: 
(a) the likelihood of default based on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac projections, which 
presumably consider various aspects of the underlying loan including: borrower debt-to-
income ratios, the percentage of loan-to-value (our underwater percentage), and borrower 
payment history just to name a few; and (b) the likely remedy for the investor after said 
default, taking into account the various fees, and associated transaction and legal costs 
associated with foreclosure.   
In an explicit opinion the Fair Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) rejects both approaches; 
the former because it looks to general pool data instead of taking into account individual 
loans on a case-by-case assessment, and the latter because a calculation of the likelihood of 
default would be largely fallible in a rising market. 105  
By way of a summary, Hockett’s Plan is legally sound under Supreme Court takings 
jurisprudence, but practical hurdles may yet limit its effectiveness.  The associated costs 
with litigating just compensation values alone may prove crippling for the Plan’s feasibility. 
Moreover, facial legality will not necessarily dissuade investors with fundamental objections 
to this type of condemnation action from raising costly legal setbacks for MRP and local 
municipalities.106 
Contract Clause Concerns
Notwithstanding what appears to be a valid exercise of eminent domain authority, 
Hockett’s Plan may also have to overcome challenges based on a violation of the 
Constitution’s Contracts Clause.107  It provides that “[n]o State shall … pass any … Law 
impairing the Obligation of Contracts ….”108  Oddly enough, the Contracts Clause was 
included in the Constitution primarily to promote economic stability by preventing further 
state-enacted debtor relief legislation after the Revolutionary War.109   Opponents of MRP 
and Hockett’s Plan are therefore not out of line to assert that the Plan is the very kind 
of action that drove the Constitution’s framers to include the Contract Clause in the first 
place.110 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 152-599 FHFA Takes a Strong Position Against Eminent Domain Plans, (Aug. 8, 2013).
106 See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, CV 13 3663, U.S. District Ct. for the Northern District of California (Aug. 7, 20a13). 
107 While the Supreme Court has noted that “the Contract Clause has never been thought to protect against the exercise of the power of 
eminent domain” Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 243 n. 6 (emphasis added), it is a non-sequitur that such an action would be immune from attack as a 
violation of the Contracts Clause.
108 U.S. Const. art. I. § 10, cl, 1.
109 Richard A. Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 703, 706 (1984). 
110 “The goal and effect of the MRP proposal is precisely the danger contemplated by the Contracts Clause: the abrogation of valid debts 
because a local jurisdiction desires to reduce the debt born by local residents.”
Cornell Real Estate REview
57
Although it was one of the strongest constitutional limitations on state legislation in our 
country’s youth,111 the Contract Clause has had limited reach in the last century.  When it 
began to regress on the issue, the Supreme Court opined that “literalism in the construction 
of the contract clause … would make it destructive of the public interest by depriving the 
State of its prerogative of self-protection.”112  In short, the Court ultimately concluded that 
giving true literal effect to the clause’s language could hamper or destroy economic growth 
and necessary regulation. 
At any rate, a modern Contract Clause analysis first requires a determination of 
whether and to what degree the challenged action imposes a “substantial impairment [on] 
a contractual relationship.”113  The impairment’s severity correspondingly increases the 
level of judicial scrutiny.114
Several of the Plan’s finer points potentially heighten the level of contractual 
impairment.  Consider the following: (a) The Plan seeks not to limit or alter the terms of the 
various underlying contracts; it seeks to invalidate them entirely.  (b) MBS investors bought 
into the various securitized units expecting that they would perform according to market 
standards and the terms of their contracts over a period of years, or that they would fail and 
give them a legal remedy, not with the expectation of receiving a grossly discounted lump 
sum at some indeterminable point in the future.  So not only are the terms of the investors’ 
contracts themselves invalidated, the effects on the investors are much different than the 
risks and benefits that they initially bargained for. And (c), the level of impairment is 
particularly heightened when considering the structure of the secondary mortgage market 
itself.  On this point, not only would the Plan invalidate the investors’ contracts, it would 
also invalidate homeowners’ contracts, loan servicers’ contracts, insurers’ policy contracts, 
loan originators’ contracts with secondary market brokers, and the contracts of  any other 
related parties that may have a vested interest in a mortgage.  The complicated secondary 
market’s structure that calls for a “collective action solution” as Professor Hockett says, 
also creates an extremely high level of contractual impairment under the Contract Clause 
analysis.115 
Second, if (or when) the challenged action is deemed a substantial impairment, the 
analysis looks to the invalidating cause (here the condemnation), to determine whether it 
proposes a “significant and legitimate public purpose.”116  As discussed supra in connection 
with takings jurisprudence, the Plan meets this requirement.
Finally, once a legitimate public purpose is identified, the judiciary will determine 
whether the reallocation of “the rights and responsibilities of contracting parties is 
based upon reasonable conditions” and is of a character responsively appropriate to the 
underlying public goal.117 
This last prong is the most problematic for the Plan. While it is similar to the 
Supreme Court’s commonly articulated Rational Basis Test, the “significant impairment” 
considerations listed above provides the third prong with a certain amount of contextual 
flexibility.  Coupling this necessary flexibility with the fact that the Supreme Court has not 
squarely applied the third prong since 1983 leaves future litigation in this area somewhat 
uncertain.  The result would likely hinge on a judicially imposed policy question about the 
appropriateness of using the Plan to invalidate all of the contractual obligations involved 
in the underlying transactions. 
Walter Dellinger, Jonathan Hacker, Matthew Close, San Bernardino Eminent Domain Proposal, 67 Consumer Fin. L.Q. Rep. 164, 169 (2013).
111 Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 241 (1978).
112 Id. Quoting W. B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 426, 433 (1934). But see James Madison, The Federalist No. 44 (“[L]aws impairing 
the obligation of contracts are contrary to the first principles of the social compact, and to every principle of sound legislation.”).
113 Allied Structural Steel, 438 U.S. at 244. 
114 Energy Reserves Grp. Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 411 (1983).
115 See generally, Hockett, It Takes a Village, supra note 4. 
116 Energy Reserves, 459 U.S. at 411.
117 Id. Quoting U.S. Trust Co. of New York v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 22 (1977).
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Dormant Commerce Clause Concerns
Facially the Commerce Clause is simply an affirmative grant of power to Congress, 
allowing it to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States 
….”118  However, as arguably intended, 119 and now formally recognized,120 the Dormant or 
Negative Commerce Clause provides an offsetting reciprocal limitation on a state’s ability 
to regulate commerce.
Though the mechanics of the clause can invalidate state actions in a variety of ways, 
the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine as it applies to the Plan is articulable as follows: 
where the state action or law “regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local 
public interest, and its effects on interstate [commerce] are only incidental, it will be upheld 
unless the burden imposed on [interstate] commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the 
putative local benefits.”121  If a “legitimate public purpose” is acknowledged, then resort is 
had to a balancing test; the burden that will be permitted is dependent upon (a) the nature 
of the local interest, and (b) whether or not it could be alternatively implemented with a less 
intrusive impact on interstate commerce.122  
As the Plan’s creation centered on remedying both nationwide and local market defects, 
its local public benefits are largely self-explanatory.  The less-clear, and thus more likely 
litigated issue will be an application of the so-called balancing test.  
Though somewhat circular, for purposes of the balancing test the nature of the local 
interest should be considered aside from the Plan’s national benefits because foundationally, 
the Commerce Clause itself deals with interstate regulations.  Local benefits include economic 
stability through reduced quantities of foreclosures within a given area, reduced strain on 
the local authorities who facilitate the foreclosure process, consistent revenue through local 
property taxes, and potentially keeping a fair number of people in their homes (assuming 
the Plan works as intended).  
Alternatively, whether or not there are other less restrictive means available that could 
achieve the same results necessarily incorporates considerations of the negative effects the 
Plan would have on interstate commerce.  These include: litigation costs borne by affected 
parties domiciled in other jurisdictions; instability in both domestic (nationwide) and 
foreign investment markets; responsive mortgage industry cost increases to compensate 
for uncertainty; chilled nationwide lending; and the concernedly potential overlap between 
federal regulation of the primary and secondary mortgage markets, and state efforts to 
circumvent such federal regulation. 
Though balancing these considerations is left to the judiciary, another governmental 
authority—the FHFA—has weighed in. 
Where a federal interest exists and is established, that interest would preempt 
a conflicting state interest. Here, the interest of the Conservator to preserve and 
conserve assets and to operate the Enterprises in conservatorships would be superior 
to the interest of a locality to alter the terms of a contract held by the Enterprises 
either through their ownership of a mortgage-backed security, their guarantee of a 
pool of mortgages or their ownership of a mortgage held in portfolio. As regulator 
for the Home Loan Banks, entrusted with safety and soundness responsibilities by 
federal law, concern would exist for any de-stabilization of investments held by the 
Banks as well as for values for collateral pledged to secure advances. 123
118 U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
119 “Mr. Madison.   Whether the States are now restrained from laying tonnage duties depends on the extent of the power ‘to regulate com-
merce.’ These terms are vague but they seem to exclude this power of the States— They may certainly be restrained by Treaty.”  2 The Records 
of the Federal Convention of 1787 (Max Farrand ed., 1911). 
120 See generally 41 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 1 (Originally published in 2009).
121 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
122 Id.  
123 See FHFA Opinion, supra, note 105.
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While not dispositive, strong opposition by federal agencies who regulate housing and 
finance would certainly have a persuasive effect on judicial opinion.  Also beneficial for the 
Plan’s opponents is the quantitatively limited, but qualitatively strong precedent.
Only one case, City of Oakland v Oakland Raiders,124 has analyzed the issues raised when 
local eminent domain use affects interstate commerce.  In that case, the City of Oakland 
attempted to use its condemnation power to take intangible property—the Oakland Raiders 
Football franchise.  In applying the balancing test discussed above, the Court agreed that 
because professional football is “such a nationwide business, and so completely involved in 
interstate commerce that acquisition of a franchise by an individual state through eminent 
domain would impermissibly burden interstate commerce.”125
Like national football, but far more complex, the MBS market is so inexplicably 
intertwined with interstate commerce that the burdens it imposes likely outweigh the 
local putative benefits.  Unlike the moderate interpretive hurdles that the Plan faces 
when addressing Contract Clause challenges, the Dormant Commerce Clause may be 
more probative and influential because it allows a court to consider the Plan’s practical 
marketplace ramifications. 
Conclusion
The legal hurdles caused by the secondary mortgage market’s structure, including the 
securitization process and the resulting modification limitations of PSAs make a collective-
action solution like the one Robert Hockett proposes an attractive option to those who fear 
the negative consequences associated with further underwater loan default and foreclosure. 
Leading the Plan’s implementation charge is the small community of Richmond, 
California.126  Richmond has collaborated with the San Francisco-based MRP to create the 
Richmond CARES (Community Action to Restore Equity and Stability) program through 
which it will facilitate the Plan’s goals.127 Though other municipalities have expressed 
interest in the Plan (including Irvington, N.J. and El Monte, C.A.), all seem to be waiting on 
Richmond, making it a nationwide test case.128  
At this point in time, Richmond has preliminarily selected 624 loans, and has tried to 
negotiate with the servicers/trustees of the loans to attempt buying them outside of Court 
first (presumably at a steep discount).  Richmond has not yet actually begun condemnation 
proceedings.129
Citing the foregoing constitutional provisions, several major secondary mortgage 
market players have filed suit against Richmond in response to its preliminary actions.130 
Wells Fargo, the Bank of New York Mellon, and several others filed an action for Declaratory 
Relief to declare the Plan unconstitutional, coupled with a Request for an Injunction to 
prevent the City of Richmond from moving ahead with condemnation proceedings.131 
The filed-in Court declined to decide the issues presented however, and instead granted 
Richmond’s Motion to Dismiss because the Plaintiff’s Complaint was not yet “ripe” for 
suit.132 
124 174 Cal. App. 3d 414, 419 (1985). (“[P]laintiff contends exercise of eminent domain power can never violate the commerce clause and 
notes that no previous case has precluded an eminent domain taking under that constitutional provision. The lack of such case law, however, is 
unremarkable; it serves merely to point out that eminent domain cases have traditionally concerned real property, rarely implicating commerce 
clause considerations which deal primarily with products in the flow of interstate commerce.  Whether the commerce clause precludes taking by 
eminent domain of intangible property, however, is a novel question posed, it seems, for the first time in this case.”)
125 Id at 420.
126 See Shaila Dewan, Eminent Domain: A Long Shot Against Blight, New York Times’ Business Day (Jan. 11, 2014), available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2014/01/12/business/in-richmond-california-a-long-shot-against-blight.html?_r=2 (last visited March 25, 2015) (hereinafter 
Dewan, A long shot). 
127 Save Richmond Homes, http://www.saverichmondhomes.org/learn_more (last visited March 25, 2015); 
128 Dewan, A long Shot, supra note 126.
129 See Panel Review with Hockett & Vlahoplus, supra note 30; Wells Fargo Bank, National Association et al. v. City of Richmond et al., No. 
CV-13-03663-CRB (N.D. Cal., filed Aug. 7, 2013).  
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
132 Id.; “A claim is not ripe if it is based on ‘contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.’” 
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While Professor Hockett is not dissuaded, calling the Banks’ suit a “bluff and intimidate” 
tactic,133 Richmond has nonetheless temporarily put the Plan on hold while it explores other 
options.
Although the Plan is legally sound under current takings jurisprudence, hurdles 
including costly challenges based on valuation, and facial legal challenges based on 
arguable Contracts and Commerce Clause violations may absolve the Plan’s viability—
especially given the comparative resources of big bank-opponents.  Moreover, such an 
aggressive solution may have seemed necessary in the height of the foreclosure crisis, but 
may no longer be agreeable in what most analysts deem, a recovering market. 
Aluminum Extrusions Fair Trade Comm. v. United States, 968 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1254 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2014).
133 Robert Hockett, Sham Suits and Securitizers: Why the lawsuits by several major banks against the City of Richmond seeking declara-
tory and injunctive relief have no merit (Sep. 12, 2013), available at http://mortgageresolution.com/mrp-blog-0 (last visited March 25, 2015). 
